Poll Shows Growing Lebanese Shi'ite Support for State Control of Arms

A recent survey conducted among Lebanon's Shi'ite community has highlighted a notable shift in attitudes toward Hezbollah, the militant group that has historically relied on this demographic for its core support. The data, collected in September by Statistics Lebanon, suggests that a substantial majority of respondents now believe the group's weapons should be placed under the control of the Lebanese state rather than remaining in the hands of the movement's leadership.

The poll, which included 800 Shi'ite participants, revealed that 66.4% supported handing over Hezbollah's arsenal to the state. Conversely, 29.6% of respondents indicated a preference for the group retaining its weapons. This finding stands in contrast to Hezbollah's long-standing argument that its military strength is indispensable for defending Lebanon against external threats, particularly from Israel.

Further details reported by Kataeb.org, the online platform of the Christian Kataeb Party which opposes Hezbollah, underscore the desire for centralized state authority. The analysis noted that 71.1% of those surveyed believed decisions regarding war and peace should rest exclusively with the Lebanese government. Only a small fraction, 5.9%, felt that Hezbollah's leadership should play an expanded role in shaping the country's future direction.

Confidence in the Lebanese Armed Forces appears robust within the community. Approximately 78.5% of respondents expressed trust in the army, while 51.1% identified it as the institution best suited to guarantee long-term security. In comparison, only 16.5% selected Hezbollah for this role. These figures challenge the group's traditional claim to be the primary defender of Shi'ite security interests.

The results were not entirely uniform, as 67.4% of participants stated that Hezbollah had either failed or only partially met its objectives in the recent conflict with Israel. Additionally, 42.1% expressed disappointment, anger, or concern regarding the group's leadership and the war's aftermath. Despite this criticism, 59.5% still reported some level of trust in Hezbollah, with 37.1% indicating a great deal of trust. Roi Kais, a reporter for Israel's public broadcaster KAN, noted that the group's support networks and status within the sect continue to sustain its strength, provided no other entity fills the resulting vacuum.

The current findings differ markedly from an earlier survey. In a June 10 analysis for Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, researchers Orna Mizrahi and Moran Levanoni cited a May 2026 poll by Information International. That survey found that 87.5% of Shi'ite respondents opposed disarming Hezbollah, with only 7.9% supporting the transfer of weapons. The discrepancy has raised questions about how specific wording or agenda setting might influence public opinion results.

Mizrahi and Levanoni argued that Hezbollah's influence is deeply rooted in social and economic networks, political power, and the historical marginalization of the Shi'ite population. They noted that intimidation has often discouraged dissent within the community. To weaken the group, they suggested that a stronger Lebanese army combined with financial support from Western and Gulf nations is necessary to allow the state to replace the services currently provided by Hezbollah.

Signs of local wariness have emerged in recent weeks. In the southern city of Tyre, property owners reportedly opposed the establishment of a branch for Al-Qard Al-Hassan, a Hezbollah-linked financial institution, within one of their buildings due to fears of it becoming a target in an Israeli strike. Such branches have been hit in the past. Meanwhile, Hezbollah announced aid packages of up to $14,000 for eligible families in Beirut and its southern suburbs whose primary homes were destroyed, and up to $12,000 for those in other areas.

The group has suffered significant military and leadership losses, including the death of Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024. A new war erupted in March 2026, causing heavy destruction in villages across southern Lebanon. Whether the observed discontent translates into political change will likely depend on the Lebanese state's ability to provide security, reconstruction, and economic opportunities for its citizens.